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Advanced Academic
Update
"The Aid Effectiveness Puzzle –
Completing the Picture?"
Maastricht 14-15 October 2008
Programme
Word of Welcome
Prof. Chris de Neubourg (Academic
Director MGSoG, Maastricht
University)
Key Note 1: What has Accra
produced? Where do we stand and
what is the political reality
with respect to improving aid
effectiveness?
Koos Richelle, Director-General
of EuropeAid Co-operation
Office, Brusels, Belgium
Session 1: Governance
implications of moving toward a
program based approach and the
use of general budget support
Stephen Lister, Mokoro Ltd.,
Oxford, United Kingdom
Discussant: Andrew Lawson
In recent years the donor community
shifted their aid paradigm from
project aid to programme based
approaches. The latter, which
includes aid modalities such as
pooled funding, sector and general
budget support, is supposed to be
more effective because it gives
ownership to the recipient
government. However, aid dependant
countries might loose their
incentives to improve growth if they
receive too much foreign assistance.
Also, direct budget support affects
power relations within a government,
as it is typically managed by the
Ministries of Finance. Changing
accountability relations might be
undesirable in countries with weak
democracy.
The application of direct budget
support gives prominence to
institutional development objectives,
specifically to the requirements for
open, accountable and capable
governments. One important reason
for this shift away from project aid
is that project aid makes use of
parallel non governmental management
systems whereas the opposite is
preferred under the new aid paradigm.
Another reason is that the use of
donor specific review and approval
mechanisms undermine government
ownership and even domestic
democratic accountability. Budget
support is assumed to redress these
disadvantages. It makes use of
public finance management, increases
therefore the possibility to
strengthen governmental systems; it
reduces transaction costs through
donor coordination, strengthens
ownership through better alignment
to recipient government agenda’s and
policies and at the same time raises
the potential for strengthening
political dialogue as well as
improving domestic accountability.
Despite these expectations of the
use of budget aid, the first
evaluations of general budget
support (GBS) in different countries
have shown varied degrees of success
for various reasons. Lawson, Booth
and others (2005) found that GBS in
Tanzania for example, has had
positive effects though not at all
expected levels and in all areas[1].
They concluded that many of the
effects that have not been reached (yet)
strongly depend on the underlying
domestic political and institutional
factors (internal governance
conditions). Another important
finding from the Tanzania evaluation
is that there is no evidence of a
reduction in transaction costs. This
raises the question about the
necessary conditions under which
donor coordination will reduce
transaction costs and result in more
effective aid delivery (external
governance conditions).
Session 2: The impact of aid
modalities on accountability
relationships
Paolo de Renzio (ODI) –
Ownership, sovereignty and
accountability: is budget
support a solution or a problem?
Robert Jenkins (Ralph Bunche
Institute) and Dr. Anne Marie
Goetz (UNIFEM)
Accountability has become a major
issue in recent development debates
around good governance,
anticorruption policies,
democratization debates and aid
effectiveness. There seems to be
little discussion among donors about
the values of accountability for
society. It is thought to provide
for public democratic control,
prevent the misuse or abuse of power
and enhance governance
responsiveness and effectiveness,
reflecting more legitimate
governance. But how is aid impacting
on accountability relations in
recipient countries?
Evaluations of project aid (off
budget) showed that in a majority of
projects, the use of donor-specific
mechanisms of accountability are
corroding the normal structures of
democratic accountability. Budget
support is assumed to improve
accountability, not only to donors
but, more importantly, domestically
from recipient governments to its
citizens. In practice, however, the
former greatly outperforms the
latter. According to some this is
mainly due to the imposed
conditionalities that push recipient
governments for more external
accountability to donors.
Evaluations of budget support also
show that improvements in domestic
accountability do not come
automatically. On the contrary,
there is increasing empirical
evidence from country studies that
budget aid might even undermine or
weaken the roles of traditional
domestic accountability institutions
like for example parliaments and
political parties. The strong
oversight role that donors assume in
the government budgeting process
runs the risk to replace the role of
parliament. In addition to this, the
strong focus of donors to push for
participation of civil society in
national decision making processes
like poverty strategy plans or
national development plans may
further deteriorate the role of
political parties. Given that
budget support does not seem to be
the panacea for the accountability
problems that were apparent in
project aid, the question arises to
what extent and under what
conditions does aid strengthen or
distort the accountability
relationship between recipient
governments and their citizens?
Debate: Governance implications and
accountability – linking back to
Accra
Introduction by: James Mackie,
ECDPM
Key Note 2: Aid effectiveness and
accountability – a donor’s
perspective
Maarten Brouwer, Ministry of Of
Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands
Session 3:
How to measure aid effectiveness?
Dr. Howard White (International
Initiative for Impact Evaluation)
– How can we best study aid
effectiveness?
Mr. Deo Mutalemwa
Frieda Vandeninden (MGSoG) –
Foreign Aid Transaction Costs
The discussion on aid performance
seems to overlook the definition of
‘effectiveness’. It makes it
difficult to find adequate and
unambiguous indicators for aid
effectiveness beyond the general
ones featuring in the Paris
Declaration. The 2006 OECD Survey on
Monitoring the Paris Declaration
clearly shows that in measuring
several of the 12 criteria,
conceptual differences and lack of
standardized definitions (e.g. what
is a joint mission?) caused for
difficult and unreliable universal
measurement, subsequently affecting
the reliability of the survey’s
findings.
Moreover, the survey did not address
some more broader issues in relation
to the measurement of aid
effectiveness. What is the ultimate
objective of aid? What timeframe do
we need to consider? When is aid
effective, and which indicators
could be chosen to track the
progress towards (more) effective
aid? Which methodological approaches
are feasible for measuring aid
effectiveness? What are the
implications of the Paris
Declaration’s commitment to rely
more and more on partner country
government systems? What are some of
the recent practices with
cooperation among donors in this
area?
This session will focus on some of
the key challenges and prospects in
measuring aid effectiveness, where
possible drawing on some recent
country case studies that become
available in the run-up towards
Accra.
[1] Lawson, A., D. Booth,
et al. (2005). Does General
Budget Support
Work? Evidence from
Tanzania., Overseas
Development Institute,
London.
Session 4: The use of
conditionalities:
policy-based versus
outcome-based
Alex Wilks (EURODAD) –
Beyond conditionality:
increasing trust,
deepening ownership
Andrew Lawson, Director
of Fiscus Public Finance
Consultants Limited,
United Kingdom
Prof. Dr. Lennart
Wohlgemuth (University
of Gothenburg)
Whereas the term was conspicuously
absent in the Paris Declaration,
some room has been reserved for
Accra to talk about the use of
conditionalities and their
implications for the effectiveness
of aid. The first consultative draft
of the Accra Agenda for Action
includes the intention of donors and
partner countries to move towards an
‘International Code of Conduct’
aiming at reducing overlap between
conditions, harmonizing their
application and make them more
effective for promoting ownership
and mutually agreed results.
Today’s practice however shows the
exact opposite of these three aims,
and also highlights the use of two
specific types of conditionalities:
policy-based conditionality which
tend to prescribe certain policy
actions as a condition for funding,
and outcome-based conditionality
which leaves the government to
decide the policy actions to attain
an agreed outcome. The situation in
practice further complicates the
picture, as different development
agencies prefer using different
types of conditionalities, and
definitions of these types also show
some fluctuations.
A resolution by the European
Parliament on the 22nd of May 2008
called upon the Commission and the
Member States to “phase out
policy-oriented conditionality,
especially economic policy
conditionality, to support a common
understanding on key priorities, and
to use their influence to convince
the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to support the same
position.” Given the Parliament’s
emphasis, and calls from
international NGOs advocating for
similar change, it would seem
pertinent for this seminar to focus
on recent academic thinking and
practical experiences with the
application of different types of
conditionality.
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